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1018 
Note 
CLAPPER v. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA: ALLOWING THE 
FISA AMENDMENTS ACT OF 2008 TO TURN “INCIDENTALLY” 
INTO “CERTAINLY” 
LIZ CLARK RINEHART

 
In February 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,
1
 which considered whether United 
States persons
2
 who frequently interacted with foreign nationals living 
abroad had standing to challenge the constitutionality of 50 U.S.C. Section 
1881a, a controversial part of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(“FISA”).3  Added through Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 
2008, Section 1881a expanded the scope of FISA surveillance the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”)4 could authorize while 
simultaneously reducing judicial power to oversee and supervise the 
surveillance.
5
  In Amnesty International, the plaintiffs claimed the 
government was highly likely to intercept their conversations using Section 
1881a surveillance due to their numerous international contacts.
6
  The Court 
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 1.  133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). 
 2.  A “United States person,” as used in Title 50 of the United States Code, is “a citizen of 
the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . , an unincorporated 
association a substantial number of members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United 
States.”  50 U.S.C. § 1801 (i) (2006).  This Note will use “person” and “persons” accordingly. 
 3.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. 
 4. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court chooses eleven federal judges to sit on the FISC 
and rule on FISA applications.  50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1) (2006). 
 5.  See infra Part I. 
 6.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1142–43.  Like the Court and the parties, this Note will refer 
to Section 1881a, rather than Section 702, though many commentators refer to the law in question 
as Section 702.  See, e.g., Orin Kerr, The Overcollection Problem Identified in the 2011 FISC 
Opinion, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 22, 2013, 1:52 AM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2013/08/22/the-overcollection-problem-identified-in-the-2011-fisc-
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held that the plaintiffs lacked standing, however, because they could not 
show the government had intercepted their conversations or that 
government interception was “certainly impending.”7  Because the plaintiffs 
could not show a certainly impending injury through government 
interception, the Court also denied standing based on the costs the plaintiffs 
incurred to prevent the interception of their communications.
8
 
One of the first reasons the Court cited for denying standing was that 
the plaintiffs, as U.S. persons, could not be targeted for surveillance under 
the challenged statute.
9
  According to the Court, to preserve the chain of 
causation linking the injury to the statute, the plaintiffs needed to prove 
specific third-party actions were certain to occur; namely, that the 
government would seek a surveillance order targeting their contacts, the 
FISC would approve the order, and the government would successfully 
implement the order.
10
  This analysis created an unnecessarily high 
standard.  Congress contemplated individuals like the plaintiffs as being 
potentially affected by the statute because Section 1881a surveillance could 
incidentally intercept their conversations with targeted individuals.
11
  The 
Court, therefore, should have avoided the third-party causation analysis and 
instead examined whether the plaintiffs, having been incidentally 
intercepted rather than targeted, were asserting a cognizable legal right.
12
 
Traditionally, non-targeted individuals could not assert Fourth 
Amendment challenges
13
 to surveillance that incidentally intercepted their 
communications.
14
  While the incidental interception exception is grounded 
in years of precedent, the Court should have reassessed whether the 
exception is appropriate given the high risk of substantial government 
intrusion Section 1881a surveillance poses.
15
  As written and as applied, 
Section 1881a permits a level of government intrusion distinguishable from 
the level of intrusion in cases supporting the incidental interception 
                                                          
opinion/ (“The FISC’s newly-declassified 2011 Opinion on the NSA’s implementation of Section 
702 surveillance is both dense and fascinating.”). 
 7.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1143. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. at 1148. 
 10.  Id. at 1148–50.   
 11.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 13.  Although the plaintiffs in Amnesty International asserted several claims, Amnesty Int’l, 
133 S. Ct. at 1146, this Note will focus solely on their Fourth Amendment claim, which is the 
most plausible challenge to broad-scope surveillance.  See David Gray & Danielle Citron, The 
Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 67 (2013) (describing the Fourth Amendment 
implications of new surveillance technologies). 
 14.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 15.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
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exception.
16
  By ignoring the incidental interception question, the Court’s 
decision in Amnesty International created an exceptional standing condition 
for broad-scope surveillance, not because future plaintiffs will fail to show 
they have been intercepted, but because the interception of a non-targeted 
individual may not be an injury to a cognizable right.
17
  Even if the Court 
had upheld the incidental interception exception and refused to grant 
standing to the plaintiffs, a clear decision interpreting how new forms of 
surveillance do or do not affect the exception would have given much 
needed guidance to lower courts.
18
  It would also have signaled to Congress 
whether more statutory protections are needed.
19
  The current scope of the 
possible surveillance, however, strongly supports narrowing the exception 
to prevent the creation of another class of people who can expect less 
Fourth Amendment protection than others.
20
  In avoiding this issue, the 
Court in Amnesty International missed a crucial opportunity.
21
 
I.  THE CASE 
On July 10, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the FISA 
Amendments Act of 2008.
22
  The new Section 702, codified as 50 U.S.C. 
Section 1881a (Supp. 2012), changed the procedures the federal 
government must follow when it conducts surveillance of “non-United 
States persons located outside the United States.”23  For example, the 
government is no longer required to identify specific targets of surveillance, 
and the FISC can no longer require probable cause that the target is a 
foreign agent or that foreign agents are using the targeted facility.
24
  Instead, 
the new orders under Section 1881a can be significantly broader and less 
particularized, potentially requiring that telecommunications providers 
deliver “[a]ll telephone and e-mail communications to and from countries of 
foreign policy interest—for example, Russia, Venezuela, or Israel—
                                                          
 16.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 17.  See infra Part IV.A.  But see Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“No one here denies that the Government’s interception of a private telephone or e-mail 
conversation amounts to an injury . . . .”). 
 18.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 19.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 20.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 21.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 22.  Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), 
vacated and remanded sub nom., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), 
rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).  The case name changed when James R. Clapper, Jr. became the 
Director of National Intelligence.  See FED. R. APP. P. 43 (c)(2) (automatic substitution of 
government officials). 
 23.  Amnesty Int’l, 638 F.3d at 124. 
 24.  Id. at 125–26.   
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including communications made to and from U.S. citizens and residents.”25  
Additionally, the FISA Amendments Act took the responsibility of 
monitoring compliance with statutory requirements away from the FISC 
and gave it to the U.S. Attorney General or the Director of National 
Intelligence.
26
  As a result, the government can authorize broader 
surveillance on a larger scale, and with less judicial monitoring, than under 
the previous version of FISA.
27
 
Amnesty International USA and other organizations filed suit in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on the 
day the FISA Amendments Act was signed into law.
28
  They challenged the 
facial constitutionality of the Act, claiming their international 
communications with individuals residing outside of the United States were 
likely to be monitored, and they were forced “to take costly and 
burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of those 
communications.”29  Both parties filed for summary judgment, with the 
government arguing that Section 1881a was constitutional and that the 
plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show they had actually 
been subject to surveillance under Section 1881a.
30
  The plaintiffs 
responded that it was sufficiently likely that their communications would be 
intercepted under Section 1881a and that, alternatively, the measures they 
took to prevent the interception should be considered injury for standing 
purposes.
31
  The district court found the plaintiffs did not have standing 
because neither their fear of surveillance nor the preventative measures they 
took to avoid surveillance met the traditionally requisite standard of 
“personal, particularized, concrete injury in fact.”32 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed and remanded back to the district court, finding both the plaintiffs’ 
reasonable fear of future surveillance and the costs of avoiding surveillance 
constituted sufficient injury in fact to support standing, when coupled with 
the “objectively reasonable likelihood” that the government would conduct 
                                                          
 25.  Id. at 126 (quoting Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 11, Amnesty International USA v. 
Blair, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4112), 2009 WL 8185998, at *11.  The court noted 
that the government had challenged how the plaintiffs characterized the “scope” of the law but had 
been unable to specify why the plaintiffs’ description was inaccurate.  Id. at 126 n.8. 
 26.  Id. at 126. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 126–27; Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 29.  Amnesty Int’l, 638 F.3d at 127. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Amnesty Int’l, 646 F. Supp. 2d at 643–44. 
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surveillance of the plaintiffs’ communications.33  After the Second Circuit 
denied rehearing en banc, the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari to consider whether the Second Circuit’s “novel view of standing” 
based on reasonable likelihood of surveillance and reasonable fear of 
surveillance met the burden for constitutional standing.
34
 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Two intersecting analyses determine whether an individual plaintiff 
has standing to challenge a program of government surveillance.
35
  First, the 
plaintiff must show a sufficient, “legally protected interest”36 in the 
outcome.
37
  Second, the plaintiff must show the challenged law, and not the 
actions of independent third parties, caused the injury to the protected 
interest.
38
  Plaintiffs typically challenge surveillance laws on numerous 
grounds,
39
 but the core complaint is often that the government action 
infringes or will infringe upon the Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches.
40
  Because certain people, such as foreign nationals 
and individuals who are not the targets of the surveillance, are exempt from 
or receive lesser Fourth Amendment protection, they face even steeper 
hurdles in showing standing to assert facial challenges.
41
 
A.  Article III of the U.S. Constitution Requires That Plaintiffs Have 
Standing to Bring a Suit in Federal Court 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution permits federal courts to hear only 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”42  As the Supreme Court explained in Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife,
43
 “One of [the] landmarks, setting apart the ‘Cases’ 
                                                          
 33.  Amnesty Int’l, 638 F.3d at 134, 138.  After the Second Circuit remanded, the government 
filed a petition for rehearing en banc on May 12, 2011.  Petition for rehearing en banc, Amnesty 
Int’l v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4112). 
 34.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). 
 35.  See infra Part II.A. 
 36.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 37.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 208 (1962). 
 38.  Id. at 208. 
 39.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1146 (noting that the plaintiffs sought a declaration 
that § 1881a violated the First and Fourth Amendment, as well as Article III of the Constitution 
and the principles underlying separation of powers); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 649–50 (6th 
Cir. 2007) (explaining that the plaintiffs claimed an NSA surveillance program “violate[d] the 
First and Fourth Amendments, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, the Administrative Procedures 
Act . . . , Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act . . . , and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act”). 
 40.  See infra Part II.B. 
 41.  See infra Part II.B. 
 42.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 43.  504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
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and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article 
III . . . is the doctrine of standing.”44  For a plaintiff to have standing to 
bring suit in federal court, she must have “a personal stake in the outcome” 
of the case,
45
 although organizations can represent the injuries of individual 
members.
46
  Whether in the context of an individual or an organization, 
standing requires alleging “specific, concrete facts” demonstrating harm, 
which the court’s favorable decision would redress.47  The harm must be 
“concrete and particularized” as well as “actual or imminent.”48  Moreover, 
the line of causation between the challenged action and the harm cannot be 
too attenuated
49
 or rely on the decision of independent parties not named in 
the suit.
50
  Put simply, for a plaintiff to successfully bring a facial 
constitutional challenge to a law in federal court, the alleged injury must 
have either already happened or be very close to happening, and the injury 
must be “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the challenged law.51 
1.  Plaintiffs Must Show Imminent or Actual, Individualized Harm 
That Is Traceable to the Contested Action 
Standing requires more than a general possibility that an individual’s 
rights will be violated if and when the government acts.
52
  The Supreme 
Court in O’Shea v. Littleton53 was unwilling to accept that the plaintiffs had 
alleged sufficient injury for standing simply by claiming that they 
represented people in the community who had been the victims of 
“selectively discriminatory enforcement and administration of criminal 
justice.”54  According to the Court, the plaintiffs had failed to allege an 
                                                          
 44.  Id. at 560. 
 45.  Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
 46.  Id. at 511. 
 47.  Id. at 508. 
 48.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.  
 49.  See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158–60 (1990) (finding the prospect of habeas 
relief based on the possible reversal of an uncontested death sentence to be too attenuated to 
confer standing). 
 50.  Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976) (“[T]he ‘case or 
controversy’ limitation of Art. III . . . requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that 
fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 
(1975) (refusing to find standing based on the possible injurious actions of local authorities who 
were not named in the suit). 
 51.  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (quoting E. Ky. Welfare Rights, 426 U.S. at 41) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 52.  Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 999 (1982) (“It is not enough that the conduct of which 
the plaintiff complains will injure someone.  The complaining party must also show that he is 
within the class of persons who will be concretely affected.”). 
 53.  414 U.S. 488 (1974). 
 54.  Id. at 491 (quoting the complaint). 
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immediate threat of injury.
55
  The Court refused to assume that in the future 
the plaintiffs would commit illegal activities for which the government 
would choose to prosecute them, and thus subject them to the alleged 
discriminatory system.
56
 
Similarly, when determining whether the threat of injury was sufficient 
for standing in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,
57
 the Court continued to 
assume that plaintiffs were generally law-abiding and that police followed 
proper procedure.
58
  In Lyons, the Supreme Court considered whether an 
individual had standing to seek an injunction banning police officers’ use of 
chokeholds.
59
  Although the police had previously placed Lyons in a 
chokehold during a traffic stop, the Court determined there was no “real and 
immediate threat” that the police would put Lyons in a chokehold again, 
despite the allegation that Los Angeles police “routinely” placed individuals 
in chokeholds.
60
  According to the Court, it was “untenable” to believe 
police placed everyone in chokeholds, and it was unlikely Lyons would 
have another similar interaction with the police, unless he broke the law.
61
  
As further evidence of the unlikelihood that Lyons would be choked again, 
the Court noted that after Lyons was placed in a chokehold, he had no more 
“unfortunate encounters” with the police before he filed his complaint.62  
Because he could not show the event in question was likely to repeat, Lyons 
did not meet the requirements for standing to seek injunctive relief in a 
federal court.
63
 
As evidenced by the Court’s refusal to relax standing requirements in 
response to the threat of dangerous police practices, the severity of the 
potential injury creates no exception to the requirement of individualized 
and particular harm.  In Whitmore v. Arkansas,
64
 for example, the Supreme 
Court considered whether a prisoner sentenced to death had standing to 
contest the death sentence of another convicted person.
65
  The inmate 
seeking to show standing, Whitmore, argued that because the other inmate, 
                                                          
 55.  Id. at 498. 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  461 U.S. 95 (1983). 
 58.  Id. at 105. 
 59.  Id. at 97–98. 
 60.  Id. at 105.  At the time of the Court’s decision, the Los Angeles police department had 
temporarily banned the use of the hold in question, but the Court concluded that because the ban 
was temporary, it did not make the case moot.  Id. at 100–101. 
 61.  Id. at 108.   
 62.  Id.  Five months passed between when Lyons was placed in the choke-hold and when he 
filed the complaint.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 113.  The Court stressed that Lyons could still seek relief through damages and that 
state courts could grant broader standing than the federal courts.  Id.  
 64.  495 U.S. 149 (1990). 
 65.  Id. at 151. 
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Simmons, had not sought appellate review of his sentence, the “heinous”66 
nature of Simmons’s crimes would not be included in the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas’s comparison analysis of how the death penalty is applied in the 
state.
67
  Whitmore argued that, although he had exhausted his appeals, he 
could still obtain federal habeas corpus relief, which would grant him a new 
trial.
68
  If he was convicted and sentenced to death again, he would seek 
another appellate review of his sentence.
69
  Because Whitmore’s crime was 
not as terrible as Simmons’s, Whitmore argued, the omission of Simmons’s 
crime from the database of death penalty crimes could “arbitrarily skew[]” 
the appellate court’s comparative analysis.70 
The Court found Whitmore’s alleged injury based on several possible 
events “too speculative to invoke the jurisdiction of an Art. III court.”71  In 
addition to questioning whether Whitmore would obtain habeas relief, the 
Court was unconvinced the Supreme Court of Arkansas might reverse 
Whitmore’s death sentence after Simmons’s crimes were added to the 
database.
72
  The Court also refused to “create an exception to traditional 
standing doctrine for this case,” even though Whitmore argued that the 
death penalty presented special circumstances where society had an 
unusually high interest in promoting fair application of the law.
73
  In flatly 
rejecting this proposal, the Court reminded Whitmore that Article III 
requirements are grounded in the Constitution and cannot be manipulated 
for the sake of “an appealing case.”74 
Although the likelihood of injury cannot be overly speculative, as it 
was in Whitmore, standing does not require plaintiffs to wait for the injury 
to occur.
75
  The Supreme Court has found standing based on the threat of 
                                                          
 66.  Id. at 157.  The other inmate, Ronald Gene Simmons, murdered fourteen members of his 
family and two other people, id. at 151, while Whitmore murdered a woman during a robbery.  Id. 
at 157. 
 67.  Id. at 157. 
 68.  Id. at 156. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 156–57. 
 71.  Id. at 157. 
 72.  Id.  The Court pointed out that in the original consideration of Whitmore’s death 
sentence, the Arkansas court “simply noted that defendants in similar robbery-murder capital 
crimes had also been sentenced to death,” and there was no indication that the court would 
consider Simmons’s crimes in Whitmore’s sentencing because Simmons had committed multiple 
murders during a killing spree, rather than a single robbery-murder like Whitmore.  Id.  
 73.  Id. at 161. 
 74.  Id.  Justice Marshall, in his dissent, asserted that the Court was within its authority to 
consider the case if it could prevent the possibly unconstitutional execution of Simmons.  Id. at 
167, 177–78 (“The Court certainly has the authority to expand or contract a common-law doctrine 
where necessary to serve an important judicial or societal interest.”).  
 75.  See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 154 (1967) (allowing pharmaceutical 
companies to challenge regulations on drug labels before the regulations were put into effect 
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enforcement of a law when it is apparent that the law is directed at the 
plaintiffs.  For instance, in Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n,76 the 
Court granted standing to booksellers seeking to challenge a law that 
prohibited the selling or displaying of adult materials to juveniles.
77
  The 
Court determined the statute was “aimed directly at [the] plaintiffs, who, if 
their interpretation of the statute [was] correct, [would] have to take 
significant and costly compliance measures or risk criminal prosecution.”78  
That the state had not yet enforced the law or prosecuted any of the 
plaintiffs was not determinative, the Court reasoned, because “[t]he State 
ha[d] not suggested that the newly enacted law [would] not be enforced, 
and [the Court saw] no reason to assume otherwise.”79  The Court also 
emphasized that the alleged harm was that of “self-censorship,” which “can 
be realized even without an actual prosecution.”80 
The Court has found standing in other pre-enforcement cases 
involving laws that would clearly affect certain individuals, such as the 
Medicaid recipients challenging nursing home decisions in Blum v. 
Yaretsky.
81
  The Court in Blum held that the nursing home residents had 
standing to challenge the procedural adequacy of facility-initiated transfers 
even though there was no indication the residents bringing suit would be 
transferred.
82
  The Court recognized the regulations in question did not 
directly cause the alleged potential injury because the nursing home board 
made individual determinations.
83
  The regulations, however, required that 
facilities create the board, and the board’s determination could result in a 
                                                          
because “the regulation is directed at them in particular[,] it requires them to make significant 
changes in their everyday business practices[, and] if they fail to observe the Commissioner’s rule 
they are quite clearly exposed to the imposition of strong sanctions”), abrogated on unrelated 
grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).  
 76.  484 U.S. 383 (1988). 
 77.  Id. at 387–88. 
 78.  Id. at 392. 
 79.  Id. at 393. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  457 U.S. 991, 994–95, 1000 (1982). 
 82.  Id. at 999–1000. 
 83.  Id.; see also id. at 1003 (“[R]espondents are not challenging particular state regulations or 
procedures, and their arguments concede that the decision to discharge or transfer a patient 
originates not with state officials, but with nursing homes that are privately owned and operated.  
Their lawsuit, therefore, seeks to hold state officials liable for the actions of private parties, and 
the injunctive relief they have obtained requires the State to adopt regulations that will prohibit the 
private conduct of which they complain.”). 
  
2014] CLAPPER v. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA 1027 
transfer.
84
  Thus, a law is not required to directly target an individual with a 
specific injury for it to pose sufficient potential harm to confer standing.
85
 
2.  The Supreme Court Has Been Unwilling to Make Exceptions to 
the Standing Doctrine for Suits Alleging Violations of 
Constitutional Rights Through Surveillance 
Unlike standing cases related to overt government action, programs of 
broad government surveillance pose a different problem for plaintiffs 
seeking to show standing because so much about the programs is unknown 
and speculative.
86
  In Laird v. Tatum,
87
 a group of civilians brought a suit 
contesting an Army program that involved collecting information from 
public news sources, open meetings, and local law enforcement.
88
  Because 
the government was collecting and compiling public information, the 
plaintiffs could not allege that the government had violated their rights by 
observing private affairs.
89
  In holding that there was no standing, the Court 
emphasized that in order to support standing based on an alleged “chilling” 
of the exercise of First Amendment rights, plaintiffs must show more than 
“knowledge” of a government program or “fear that . . . the agency might in 
the future take some other . . . action detrimental to that individual.”90  The 
Court also was troubled by the possible scope of judicial power over the 
executive branch that would result from granting the plaintiffs standing, 
explaining that Congress is the proper “continuing monitor[]” of “Executive 
action.”91 
At least two federal appellate courts have interpreted Laird to hold that 
the potential “chilling effect” of surveillance was insufficient to confer 
Article III standing.
92
  In United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan,
93
 the 
                                                          
 84.  Id. at 994–95. 
 85.  See id. at 1000–01 (explaining that the threatened injury was that the nursing home 
administrators would decide to move the patients).  The Court ultimately held the facilities were 
not state actors and their procedures could not violate Fourteenth Amendment rights.  Id. at 1012.  
 86.  See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 653 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to find standing 
because, among other weaknesses, “the plaintiffs do not—and because of the State Secrets 
Doctrine cannot—produce any evidence that any of their own communications have ever been 
intercepted by [the federal government’s surveillance program] or without warrants”). 
 87.  408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 88.  Id. at 6. 
 89.  Id. at 9. 
 90.  Id. at 11. 
 91.  Id. at 15.  Justice Douglas, writing for the dissent, called the program of military 
surveillance “a gross repudiation of our traditions,” id. at 23, citing a history of “civilian 
supremacy and subordination of military power.”  Id. at 19.  Justice Douglas found the majority’s 
conclusion that respondents lacked standing “too transparent for serious argument.”  Id. at 24. 
 92.  See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 661 (6th Cir. 2007) (reviewing Laird and 
concluding that a “chilling” effect is not sufficient injury regardless of the type of speech the 
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United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit refused 
to find standing to challenge a surveillance program, even though the 
plaintiffs alleged they had been targets of surveillance in the past and that 
they were likely targets of surveillance in the future.
94
  Because the 
plaintiffs had not alleged that their surveillance was a direct result of the 
challenged law, the court found that the plaintiffs appeared to be 
challenging the entirety of the executive branch’s intelligence-gathering 
program, which was too much of a “generalized grievance” to meet the 
injury requirement.
95
 
Not all courts have chosen to apply Laird to modern surveillance 
cases.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
held in Jewel v. NSA
96
 that plaintiffs, who were telephone customers, had 
standing to challenge the government’s application of several surveillance 
statutes.
97
  The court found no issue with the plaintiffs’ allegations of 
particularized injury because at least one plaintiff had alleged she had been 
a target of the broad, dragnet surveillance program and described the 
program in great detail.
98
  The court distinguished the case from other 
surveillance cases because the present case was at the “initial pleading 
stage” rather than the summary judgment stage, during which the court 
expects to review a full record.
99
  At this stage in the proceedings, the court 
concluded, the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient injury for standing.
100
 
                                                          
government action affects); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 
1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding that Laird requires a direct harm to plaintiffs). 
 93.  738 F.2d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 94.  Id. at 1380. 
 95.  Id. at 1381 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also ACLU, 493 F.3d at 648 (holding 
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program).  In 
ACLU, the Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ theory that they sustained injury by installing 
protective measures to prevent interception because the plaintiffs could not produce any evidence 
that they had been subjected to the surveillance or that they would be subjected to the surveillance.  
Id. at 648, 673–75.   
 96.  673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 97.  Id. at 906.  Jewel alleged constitutional violations as well as violations of “the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 
the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).”  Id. 
(citations omitted). 
 98.  Id. at 910. 
 99.  Id. at 911. 
 100.  Id.  The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs in this case may eventually “face similar 
procedural, evidentiary and substantive barriers as the plaintiffs in ACLU.”  Id. 
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B.  The Standing Requirements to Bring Fourth Amendment Challenges 
to Government Surveillance Programs Require a Consideration of 
the Merits of the Case, but Are Also Subject to Individual 
Exceptions 
The issue of standing in Fourth Amendment cases is “subsumed” by 
the Fourth Amendment analysis.
101
  Standing to challenge surveillance 
based on the Fourth Amendment therefore requires that surveillance affect a 
right protected by the Fourth Amendment.  Since Berger v. New York,
102
 the 
Supreme Court has recognized the potential of wiretapping laws to violate 
the Fourth Amendment, regardless of whether the government physically 
trespasses on an individual’s property, if the laws are broad enough to 
authorize “general warrant[s].”103  Absent special circumstances, a warrant 
may still be required to avoid Fourth Amendment violations even if the 
method of surveillance is narrowed.  For example, the Court in Katz v. 
United States
104
 refused to create an exception that would allow law 
enforcement to wiretap public pay phones absent a warrant, reasoning that 
surveillance did not fall within the exceptions for search incident to arrest, 
“hot pursuit,” or suspect consent.105  Since Katz and Berger, however, 
Congress has passed legislation designed to conform to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence while still allowing law enforcement to use wiretapping to 
investigate crimes.
106
  Concurrently, courts have crafted exceptions to 
Fourth Amendment protection that expand the government’s ability to 
conduct surveillance, notably the lack of Fourth Amendment protection for 
foreign individuals living abroad
107
 and for U.S. persons who are not the 
targets of the surveillance.
108
 
                                                          
 101.  Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978) (“[W]e think the better analysis forthrightly 
focuses on the extent of a particular defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment, rather than 
on any theoretically separate, but invariably intertwined concept of standing.”).  The Court further 
explained, however, that “nothing we say here casts the least doubt on . . . [the] general 
proposition [that] the issue of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a 
particular legal right has alleged ‘injury in fact,’ and, second, whether the proponent is asserting 
his own legal rights and interests.”  Id. 
 102.  388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
 103.  Id. at 64; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“The Government’s 
activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy 
upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and 
seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 104.  389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 105.  Id. at 357–58 nn.20–22 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925) (search 
incident to arrest); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967) (search during “hot pursuit”); 
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (search after suspect consents)).   
 106.  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 792 n.30 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
plain thrust of Title III appears to be to accommodate the holdings of Berger and Katz . . . .”). 
 107.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 108.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
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1.  The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Foreign Nationals 
from Surveillance 
Because standing requires plaintiffs show a cognizable right, one 
significant hurdle for claims like those in Amnesty International is that the 
Fourth Amendment does not reach searches conducted of foreign citizens in 
foreign countries.
109
  In United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,
110
 the Supreme 
Court determined that the history of the Fourth Amendment showed that the 
Framers did not intend its protections to extend beyond U.S. territories.
111
  
The Court further explained that for an alien to benefit from Fourth 
Amendment protections while in the United States, she must develop 
“substantial connections with this country,”112 which the plaintiff, by being 
detained in the United States for only a few days at the time of the search, 
had not done.
113
  According to the Court, any additional protections were 
political issues and should be created “through diplomatic understanding, 
treaty, or legislation.”114  Lower courts have interpreted Verdugo-Urquidez 
to mean that foreign nationals cannot challenge wiretap evidence on Fourth 
Amendment grounds.
115
 
2.  The Fourth Amendment Does Not Protect Non-Targeted 
Individuals Whose Communications Are Incidentally 
Intercepted 
The Supreme Court approved the use of incidentally intercepted 
communications in United States v. Kahn.
116
  In Kahn, the government had 
obtained a judicial order under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act of 1968
117
 to wiretap a suspected bookmaker’s phone and 
intercept his conversations and the conversations of “others as yet 
                                                          
 109.  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990). 
 110.  494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 111.  Id. at 266 (“[I]t was never suggested that the provision was intended to restrain the 
actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United States territory.”). 
 112.  Id. at 271. 
 113.  Id. (“But this sort of presence—lawful but involuntary—is not of the sort to indicate any 
substantial connection with our country.”). 
 114.  Id. at 275. 
 115.  See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement does not apply to searches by U.S. agents in foreign 
territories); United States v. Emmanuel, 565 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because the 
Fourth Amendment does not apply to nonresident aliens whose property is searched in a foreign 
country, there is no need to decide whether the Bahamian officials acted as agents of the United 
States or whether the wiretap was a joint venture.  The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
simply is not available to Emmanuel with respect to the Bahamian wiretap evidence.”). 
 116.  415 U.S. 143 (1974). 
 117.  18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012). 
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unknown.”118  In the course of the wiretap, the government intercepted 
conversations implicating the bookmaker’s wife as being part of the 
gambling operation, and the couple was indicted on the basis of the wiretap 
evidence.
119
  The Court determined that the wife’s conversations were 
properly intercepted under the order because the language broadened the 
targets of the wiretap to “others as yet unknown.”120  The Court therefore 
refused to interpret the language of Title III as requiring law enforcement to 
identify all those who could possibly be intercepted.
121
  In doing so, the 
Court denied that it was creating the possibility of “virtual general 
warrants” because the judicial order was limited by time, scope, and judicial 
monitoring requirements.
122
  Although Congress had enacted Title III in 
part to protect privacy, the Court reasoned, the legislature had also intended 
to provide law enforcement with “a weapon against the operations of 
organized crime.”123  Requiring law enforcement to identify everyone who 
could be intercepted by a wiretap would defeat that purpose.
124
  As such, 
Title III did not require that intercepted communications be confined to 
those of a named party; intercepted communications could include 
conversations between individuals who were not listed as targets of the 
wiretap.
125
 
Lower courts have interpreted Kahn to hold that interceptions of 
“incidental” parties do not violate the Fourth Amendment.126  At least one 
                                                          
 118.  415 U.S. at 145. 
 119.  Id. at 147–48. 
 120.  Id. at 152–53 (“[T]he statute says: identification is required only of those ‘known’ to be 
‘committing the offense.’  Had Congress wished to engraft a separate requirement of 
‘discoverability’ onto the provisions of Title III, it surely would have done so in language plainer 
than that now embodied in § 2518.”). 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  Id. at 154. 
 123.  Id. at 151. 
 124.  See id. at 157 (“The clear implication of [the statutory] language is that when there is 
probable cause to believe that a particular telephone is being used to commit an offense but no 
particular person is identifiable, a wire interception order may, nevertheless, properly issue under 
the statute.”). 
 125.  Id. (“Congress could not have intended that the authority to intercept must be limited to 
those conversations between a party named in the order and others, since at least in some cases, 
the order might not name any specific party at all.”). 
 126.  See, e.g., United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the 
government’s interception of the defendant’s communications was legal even though the 
defendant was not listed on the surveillance order because the order covered the device under 
surveillance, not individuals); United States v. Figueroa, 757 F.2d 466, 472 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(holding that Title III’s allowance for intercepting conversations of parties “as yet unknown” does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment); In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1015 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (citing 
Kahn for the proposition that “[i]t is settled beyond peradventure that incidental collections 
occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisitions do not render those acquisitions 
unlawful”).  Kahn confirmed holdings from lower courts that considered the issue previously.  
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court, however, has refused to expand the definition of “incidental” to 
include individuals whom the government knew were probably involved in 
the illegal activities being investigated.
127
  In United States v. Bin Laden,
128
 
the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that the 
government should have obtained permission before intercepting the 
communications of an American citizen who was suspected of being 
involved in al Qaeda activities.
129
  The government argued that the 
noncitizen targets of the wiretap could not assert a Fourth Amendment 
violation, and the incidental interception exception permitted the 
government to intercept the communications of citizens who used the 
tapped lines.
130
  The court, however, distinguished the precedent cited by 
the government because the cases referred to incidentally discovered 
crimes, not incidentally intercepted people.
131
  The court concluded that the 
citizen was one of the potential targets because of his suspected affiliation 
with the targeted organization.
132
  In doing so, the court refused to expand 
the definition of “incidental” beyond “unanticipated.”133  The defendant, the 
court concluded, had a “reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and 
cellular phones.”134  Critically, the court’s interpretation still permits 
incidental, warrantless interceptions, so long as they are truly incidental.
135
 
                                                          
See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (“If probable cause has 
been shown as to one such participant, the statements of the other participants may be intercepted 
if pertinent to the investigation.”). 
 127.  United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 281–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“Ultimately, 
the Court holds that with respect to the electronic surveillance of the home and cellular phones, 
El–Hage was not intercepted ‘incidentally’ because he was not an unanticipated user of those 
telephones and because he was believed to be a participant in the activities being investigated.”), 
aff’d sub nom. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 
2008). 
 128.  126 F. Supp. 2d 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 129.  Id. at 269, 281–82. 
 130.  Id. at 281. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  Id. (“The Government asks the Court . . . to find that, although the Government clearly 
foresaw the interception of El-Hage’s conversations and suspected his involvement with al Qaeda, 
the interception was nonetheless incidental. . . . El-Hage was a known and contemplated 
interceptee of electronic surveillance of his home and cellular phones (even if he was not officially 
deemed a target) . . . .”). 
 133.  Id.  Judge Sand ultimately concluded that, although the government should have obtained 
executive permission before tapping the citizen’s phone lines, the evidence obtained would not be 
subject to exclusion “because it would not have the deterrent effect which the exclusionary rule 
requires and because the surveillance was undertaken in good faith.”  Id. at 282. 
 134.  Id. at 281. 
 135.  See id. (calling the government’s conceptualization of the incidental interception 
exemption an “expan[sion]”). 
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court reversed 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, rejecting the 
lower court’s “novel view of standing” and concluding that the plaintiffs 
had not alleged sufficient injury for Article III standing.
136
  Justice Alito, 
writing for the majority, found that the threat of injury based on fear of 
surveillance was “too speculative” and that plaintiffs cannot be permitted to 
create an injury by taking steps to prevent surveillance that may never 
occur.
137
 
The majority first explained that Article III standing is crucial to 
maintaining separation of powers within the federal government because it 
“prevent[s] the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 
political branches.”138  In accordance with this function, the majority 
reasoned, the Court has required a more stringent standing analysis when 
considering cases challenging the constitutionality of actions taken by the 
legislative or executive branches.
139
  In all cases, the majority continued, 
standing based on future injuries requires that the injurious event be 
“certainly impending,” not just “possible.”140  The majority distinguished 
this standard from the “objectively reasonable likelihood” standard the 
Second Circuit used when that court held that the plaintiffs had standing, 
calling the latter standard “inconsistent” with the former.141 
The Court cited five reasons why the plaintiffs’ fears of surveillance 
were too speculative to constitute standing.  First, the individuals with 
whom the plaintiffs communicated were not certain targets of government 
surveillance and the plaintiffs “ha[d] set forth no specific facts 
demonstrating that the communications of their foreign contacts will be 
targeted.”142 Second, the government could conduct surveillance without 
invoking Section 1881a, perhaps by using an older provision of FISA, 
which would prevent the plaintiffs from claiming their alleged injury was 
                                                          
 136.  133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). 
 137.  Id. at 1143, 1151 (“[R]espondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm 
on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”). 
 138.  Id. at 1146. 
 139.  Id. at 1147 (citing Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)).  According to the 
majority, the judiciary has been especially hesitant “to review actions of the political branches in 
the fields of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”  Id. 
 140.  Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 141.  Id.  The Court acknowledged that plaintiffs can occasionally show standing based on a 
“substantial risk” of injury, but concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet even that reduced 
burden.  Id. at 1150 n.5. 
 142.  Id. at 1148–49.  The Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not be targets because 
Section 1881a does not authorize surveillance that intentionally targets U.S. persons.  Id. at 1148.  
But see Part IV.B.  
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“fairly traceable” to Section 1881a.143  Third, the FISC might decline to 
authorize the government’s request and the surveillance would not occur.144  
Fourth, even if it did obtain FISC authorization under Section 1881a, the 
government could fail to intercept the targeted communications.
145
  Fifth, 
the government could successfully conduct surveillance of the targets, but 
not conduct surveillance of any of the plaintiffs’ communications with the 
targeted individuals.
146
  The sum total of this “chain of possibilities” 
amounted to too much speculation for the Court.
147
 
The majority also rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that they suffered 
present injury because they took measures to safeguard the confidentiality 
of their communications from government surveillance.
148
  The Court 
pointed out that the Second Circuit had “improperly water[ed] down the 
fundamental requirements of Article III [standing]” by allowing the 
plaintiffs to claim self-incurred harm based on fear of an event that was 
“not certainly impending.”149  Furthermore, the Court continued, the 
plaintiffs had a “similar incentive” to take precautions before the FISA 
Amendments Act, when the government could still conduct surveillance of 
their clients’ communications, albeit under different circumstances.150  The 
Court compared the plaintiffs’ fear of surveillance with that of the plaintiffs 
in Laird, reiterating that “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an 
adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat 
of specific future harm.”151  Likewise, the Court distinguished this case 
from other cases in which plaintiffs established standing based on fear 
because in those cases the plaintiffs had provided “concrete evidence” that 
the challenged action would “unquestionably” affect them.152 
                                                          
 143.  Id. at 1149.  The majority explained that the government could also obtain surveillance 
information from foreign governments or possibly “conduct FISA-exempt human and technical 
surveillance programs that are governed by Executive Order 12333.”  Id.  
 144.  Id. at 1149–50. 
 145.  Id. at 1150. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 1150–51.  The Court was unimpressed by the plaintiffs’ evidence supporting their 
claim of present injury.  According to the Court: “For all the focus on respondents’ supposed need 
to travel abroad in light of potential § 1881a surveillance, respondents cite only one specific 
instance of travel: an attorney’s trip to New York City to meet with other lawyers.”  Id. at 1151 
n.6. 
 149.  Id. at 1151. 
 150.  Id. at 1152 (citing one plaintiff’s declaration that he was aware of government 
surveillance of his clients’ communications before Section 1881a was enacted). 
 151.  Id. at 1152 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 152.  Id. at 1153–54.  Specifically, the Court distinguished Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw 
because the injury in Laidlaw—the discharge of pollutants—was “concededly ongoing,” rather 
than speculative.  Id. at 1153 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 
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Finally, the majority was unconvinced that denying the plaintiffs 
standing would “insulate the government’s surveillance activities from 
meaningful judicial review.”153  The Court first pointed to the FISC as 
evidence of judicial review and protection from Fourth Amendment 
violations.
154
  The Court also noted that individuals could challenge the 
acquired surveillance if the government attempts to use it “in judicial or 
administrative proceedings.”155  Alternatively, the Court suggested, “any 
electronic communications service provider” can challenge a governmental 
directive under Section 1881a before the FISC.
156
  The plaintiffs, however, 
lacked standing because their alleged injury was not a “certainly 
impending” injury and the protections against such an injury cannot be used 
to “manufacture” standing.157 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, 
dissented from the majority opinion, claiming that the harm posed by 
government surveillance was highly likely to occur, not “speculative.”158  
Additionally, based on the Court’s previous explanations of “certainly 
impending,” Justice Breyer contended that the plaintiffs had shown 
sufficient injury for standing.
159
 
Justice Breyer first outlined the changes in FISA that occurred due to 
the FISA Amendments Act, emphasizing that the government could now 
conduct “programmatic” surveillance of a broader category of foreign 
individuals with less judicial oversight.
160
  Next, Justice Breyer explained 
that the plaintiffs frequently engage in the types of communications subject 
to surveillance under FISA with individuals, such as family members and 
                                                          
528 U.S. 167, 183–184 (2000)).  In a second case cited by the plaintiffs, Meese v. Keene, the 
Court pointed out that the government had already used the law in question to deem the films the 
plaintiff wished to display illegal “political propaganda.”  Id. at 1153 (citing Meese v. Keene, 481 
U.S. 465, 467, 473–75 (1987)).  Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Monsanto v. 
Geertson because the farmers in Monsanto were able to provide scientific evidence of bee 
pollination behaviors that substantiated their fears of cross-pollination, raising it above “mere 
conjecture about possible . . . actions.”  Id. at 1153–54 (citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed 
Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2754–55, 2754–55 n.3 (2010)). 
 153.  Id. at 1154 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 60, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. 
Ct. 1138 (2013) (No. 11-1025), 2012 WL 4361439, at *60) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 1154–55.  Thus, AT&T or Verizon could challenge an order issued under Section 
1881a, but as of July 29, 2013, no telecommunications provider had done so.  Letter from Reggie 
B. Walton, Presiding Judge of FISC, to Patrick J. Leahy, U.S. Senator 7–10 (July 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/download/honorable-patrick-j-leahy. 
 157.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1155. 
 158.  Id. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 159.  Id. at 1155, 1160.  Justice Breyer did not address the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, only 
whether they had standing.  Id. at 1165. 
 160.  Id. at 1156.  
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friends, who would not have been subject to surveillance before Section 
1881a was enacted.
161
  This fact, combined with the government’s 
motivation to investigate terrorist threats using electronic surveillance, 
documented use of electronic surveillance to investigate terrorist threats, 
and “expanding” ability to conduct electronic surveillance, led Justice 
Breyer to conclude “there is a high probability that the Government will 
[use Section 1881a to] intercept at least some electronic communication to 
which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties.”162 
Justice Breyer also disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of 
“certainly impending” injury, claiming that in many cases “the word 
‘certainly’ . . . emphasizes, rather than literally defines, the immediately 
following term ‘impending.’”163  Justice Breyer cited several cases in which 
the Court had found standing based on the realistic probability of injury or a 
“genuine threat,” which Justice Breyer found the plaintiffs had shown in 
this case, in addition to present harm incurred attempting to minimize the 
threat.
164
  Further, Justice Breyer distinguished the cases on which the 
majority relied to deny standing, particularly Lujan, which the dissent 
claimed focused on “when, not whether, the threatened harm would 
occur.”165  According to Justice Breyer, “when” the harm will occur in the 
instant case was not at issue because “the ongoing threat of terrorism 
means . . . the relevant interceptions will likely take place imminently, if not 
now.”166 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court found it 
detrimental to standing that the plaintiffs, as U.S. persons, could not be 
                                                          
 161.  Id. at 1157–58. 
 162.  Id. at 1160. 
 163.  Id. at 1161. 
 164.  Id. at 1162–63.  For example, Justice Breyer cited Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 
(1988), in which the Court found sufficient injury in an ordinance forbidding landlords from 
raising rent prices “even though the landlords had not shown (1) that they intended to raise the 
relevant rents to the point of causing unreasonably severe hardship; (2) that the tenants would 
challenge those increases; or (3) that the city’s hearing examiners and arbitrators would find 
against the landlords.”  Id. at 1161 (citing Pennell, 485 U.S. at 8).  Justice Breyer also cited Davis 
v. Federal Election Commission, 554 U.S. 724 (2008), in which a candidate for office was found 
to have standing to challenge a campaign financing law even though his opponent “had decided 
not to take advantage of the increased contribution limits that the statute would have allowed,” 
because the Court thought the chance that the opponent would invoke the statute was “realistic 
and impending.”  Id. at 1161–62 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 734) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
 165.  Id. at 1165 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 564–65 n.2 (1992)). 
 166.  Id. 
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targets of Section 1881a surveillance.
167
  As such, the majority opinion 
focused on the string of events that needed to occur for plaintiffs’ 
communications to be intercepted, leading the Court to decide there were 
too many unlikely events to find standing based on imminent 
interception.
168
  This conclusion, aside from its troubling implications for 
privacy, stretches the limits of plausibility.  Section 1881a surveillance is 
entirely different from conventional wiretapping; it is broad, indiscriminate, 
and long-lasting.
169
  The assumed targets are exactly the types of clients 
with whom the plaintiffs speak, and precisely the types of targets that were 
not permitted under the previous law.
170
  It seems incredible that, of the 
numerous plaintiffs, none will have at least one conversation intercepted 
under Section 1881a’s authority.171  The reasoning that supports the Court’s 
assertion to the contrary will further confuse the analysis for imminent 
injury in future cases.
172
 
This case gave the Court an opportunity, subsequently missed, to 
reexamine the limits of the incidental interception exception to the Fourth 
Amendment.  Even if the plaintiffs could have shown the government used 
Section 1881a to intercept their communications, the incidental interception 
exception could have prevented the plaintiffs from asserting a Fourth 
Amendment violation.
173
  The existence of the Fourth Amendment 
provisions and the other minimization requirements in Section 1881a, 
however, indicate Congress was concerned with incidental interception of 
U.S. persons.
174
  The Court should have therefore analyzed the plaintiffs’ 
standing to bring a pre-enforcement Fourth Amendment challenge under a 
                                                          
 167.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 (majority opinion). 
 168.  Id. at 1148. 
 169.  Id. at 1156 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the breadth of surveillance authorized by § 
1881a); Amnesty Int’l v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 166–67 (2d Cir. 2011) (Lynch, J., concurring) 
(explaining the new powers obtained when Section 1881a was enacted); Caroline Wilson, A Guide 
to FISA § 1881a: The Law Behind It All, PRIVACYINTERNATIONAL.ORG (June 13, 2013), 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/a-guide-to-fisa-ss1881a-the-law-behind-it-all 
(summarizing the provisions of the law and noting that Congress originally enacted FISA “in 
response to abuses in domestic intelligence surveillance powers”).  Surveillance authorizations 
under Section 1881a can be effective for up to a year.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (Supp. 2012). 
 170.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1157–58. 
 171.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (“The association must allege that its 
members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the 
challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves 
brought suit.”). 
 172.  See, e.g., Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2013) (claiming, before 
discussing the Court’s analysis of imminent injury in Amnesty International, that “[t]he Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence regarding how imminent a threat must be in order to support standing . . . 
has been less than clear”). 
 173.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 174.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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less burdensome imminence standard.
175
  In conducting that analysis, the 
Court would have been forced to examine when incidental interceptions 
become so anticipated and comprehensive as to become too much like 
targeted interceptions.
176
  As the government’s ability to conduct 
surveillance improves, a narrower incidental interception exception would 
better preserve existing Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
177
  Nonetheless, 
even if the Court had been unwilling to read the Fourth Amendment more 
broadly, a complete definition of the limits of the incidental interception 
doctrine would have helped Congress determine whether Section 1881a 
should be amended to afford greater protection to U.S. persons who 
communicate with foreign nationals.
178
 
A.  The Standing Analysis in Amnesty International Creates an 
Unacceptably Broad Exception for Government Surveillance 
In Amnesty International, the Supreme Court explained that the 
standing analysis is “especially rigorous” when the Court must decide 
whether the executive or legislative branch has violated the Constitution.
179
  
While not explicitly admitting that it was creating an exception for 
intelligence gathering activities, the Court stressed that it “ha[s] often found 
a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been requested to 
review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence 
gathering and foreign affairs.”180  To support this implied deference to the 
executive, the Court cited the importance of separation of powers and 
limiting judicial authority.
181
 
The Court’s deference is misplaced and ill-suited for the problems 
broad, indiscriminate surveillance poses.  The FISA’s only check on the 
executive branch is the FISC system,
182
 which has shown itself unwilling to 
deny surveillance applications, rejecting only eleven since 1979.
183
  At the 
same time, the number of applications has increased dramatically to more 
                                                          
 175.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 176.  See infra Part IV.C.1. 
 177.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 178.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 179.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (majority opinion) (quoting 
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 180.  Id.  
 181.  Id. at 1146. 
 182.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006) (describing the composition and function of the FISC). 
 183.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1159 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the FISC rarely 
fails to approve an application); see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 
1979–2012, EPIC (May 4, 2012), http://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html. 
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than nine times the amount submitted in the first year.
184
  This imbalance is 
hardly a countervailing check on a substantial executive power.
185
  In 
addition, the FISC has admitted it has inadequate resources and information 
to monitor the activities of agencies once the application has been 
approved.
186
  Given the immense power at stake and the weakness of the 
current judicial check, the correct way to create a balanced separation of 
powers would have been to expand the Supreme Court’s authority through 
standing, or at least not to constrict it. 
Instead, the Supreme Court has crafted a standing requirement that is 
more difficult for plaintiffs to meet because of the inherent nature of 
governmental surveillance.  Based on the Court’s reasoning in Amnesty 
International, to prove they have standing, plaintiffs must show they have 
been or will certainly be the targets of surveillance.
187
  Assuming the 
plaintiffs are able to reach the discovery phase,
188
 the government is likely 
to invoke the state secrets doctrine to avoid disclosing information, as it has 
in the past.
189
  The end result is that the plaintiffs will be unable to show the 
requisite actual injury since they will be unable show specific knowledge of 
the surveillance, yet they cannot show specific knowledge of surveillance if 
they are not permitted discovery.
190
  This “catch-22” essentially insulates 
government surveillance programs from constitutional scrutiny.
191
  
                                                          
 184.  Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders, supra note 183.  In 1979, the FISC 
was presented with 199 applications.  Id.  In 2012, there were 1,856 applications.  Id. 
 185.  Carol D. Leonnig, Court: Ability to Police U.S. Spying Program Limited, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/court-ability-to-police-us-spying-
program-limited/2013/08/15/4a8c8c44-05cd-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html?hpid=z1. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  See Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148 (majority opinion) (asserting that the plaintiffs’ 
allegations of interception were not “certainly impending”). 
 188.  See Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding standing when considering 
a motion to dismiss pre-discovery, but noting that “[u]ltimately [the plaintiffs] may face similar 
procedural, evidentiary and substantive barriers as the plaintiffs” in cases considered after a record 
has been developed through discovery).   
 189.  See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 650, 650 n.2 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 
government invoked the evidentiary elements of the state secrets doctrine when refusing to 
provide plaintiffs with information about surveillance, but adding that had the surveillance 
program in question not been public knowledge, the nonjusticiability elements of the state secrets 
doctrine may have also applied).  
 190.  See Jewel, 673 F.3d at 911 (explaining the evidentiary hurdles facing plaintiffs 
challenging a governmental surveillance program); see also id. at 908 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k)) 
(describing FISA’s private right of action).   
 191.  While the recent revelations of Edward Snowden as to the NSA surveillance program do 
provide more concrete information for plaintiffs, there is questionable wisdom in relying on 
government leaks as a check on executive power.  See generally The NSA Files, THE GUARDIAN, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/the-nsa-files (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (explaining the 
timeline of the Snowden leaks and what little is known of the entire content).  See also Mark 
Mazzetti and Michael S. Schmidt, Officials Say U.S. May Never Know Extent of Snowden’s Leaks, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2013, at A1 (reporting that due to technological inadequacies the government 
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Although the Court in Amnesty International suggested that, at a criminal 
trial, plaintiffs could challenge the law if the government attempts to use 
evidence collected through surveillance,
192
 this approach has been 
unsuccessful in the past and neglects the large bulk of surveillance that does 
not result in criminal trials.
193
  Because showing actual interception is 
almost impossible, the Court has inadvertently granted the government 
functional immunity for broad surveillance programs, provided the 
government keeps the program details a secret.
194
  The problem is, of 
course, that the very secretiveness of the program is part of the harm.
195
 
B.  Because Congress Contemplated That Section 1881a Would Affect 
U.S. Persons Like the Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs’ Standing to Bring Suit 
Should Be Analyzed Without Focusing on the Actions of Third 
Parties 
The Court found it notable that the plaintiffs were not in a class of 
people targeted by the statute,
196
 but the text of Section 1881a indicates 
Congress considered the statute would possibly affect U.S. persons.
197
  If, as 
it seems likely, the plaintiffs are individuals who are directly affected by the 
statute, they should have been permitted to assert standing without showing 
                                                          
may never know what data Snowden took).  Similarly, government officials’ voluntary disclosure 
promises seem to be inadequate protection.  See Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to 
Secret Wiretaps, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at A3 (reporting that the government announced it 
will be more diligent about disclosing to defendants when evidence has been obtained through a 
FISC order, but this had not been the practice in the past). 
 192.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1154 n.8 (providing as an example United States v. Damrah, 
412 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2005), in which a defendant unsuccessfully attempted to suppress evidence 
collected through FISA-approved surveillance). 
 193.  See Savage, supra note 191 (“[N]ational security prosecutors . . . had not been 
alerting . . . defendants that evidence in their cases had stemmed from wiretapping their 
conversations without a warrant.”). 
 194.  At least one court has found that the state secret doctrine cannot apply when the details of 
the purportedly secret program are public knowledge.  See Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 
507 F. 3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2007) (“In light of extensive government disclosures about the 
[Terrorist Surveillance Program], the government is hard-pressed to sustain its claim that the very 
subject matter of the litigation is a state secret.”). 
 195.  See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1952–58 
(2013) (describing the potential harms of secret surveillance). 
 196.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148. 
 197.  This is supported by the legislative debates on the amendment.  See Jonathan W. Gannon, 
From Executive Order to Judicial Approval: Tracing the History of Surveillance of U.S. Persons 
Abroad in Light of Recent Terrorism Investigations, 6 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 59, 59–60 (2012) 
(“Although Congress eventually passed the [FISA Amendment Act of 2008] with bipartisan 
support, the legislative debate focused on several issues, including the incidental collection of 
communications of U.S. persons and the minimization of U.S. person information . . . .”). 
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that the “choices [of independent third parties] have been or will be made in 
such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.”198 
The text of Section 1881a undoubtedly indicates that the overall focus 
of the statute is surveillance of “certain persons outside the United 
States,”199 but there is also language that implies, if not directly states, that 
U.S. persons like the plaintiffs were thought to be affected, although not 
targeted, by the law.  The limitations provision of Section 1881a specifies 
that authorizations may not “intentionally target” U.S. persons living in the 
United States or abroad.
200
  Based on the term “intentionally,” this provision 
appears to permit the acquisition of such communications if the acquisition 
occurs incidentally or accidentally.  The targeting provision also requires 
that the government “prevent the intentional acquisition of any 
communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are 
known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United States.”201  
This language does not mean, however, that the targeting must prevent the 
intentional acquisition of communications between individuals located 
outside the United States and individuals located in the United States.  This 
was the exact scenario facing the plaintiffs in Amnesty International.
202
 
As the Court pointed out, the statute requires that all authorizations 
conform to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
203
  This 
requirement appears four times in total
204
 but seems somewhat redundant 
regardless of its frequency.  The targets Section 1881a permits—foreign 
nationals located abroad—do not have the ability to assert Fourth 
Amendment rights, and the limiting procedures required by the law 
preclude the intentional targeting of persons located within the United 
States who could assert Fourth Amendment rights.
205
  The remaining class 
of people who could be intercepted is composed of unintentionally 
intercepted individuals whose communications would potentially not be 
protected by the Fourth Amendment because they are not the targets of the 
surveillance.
206
  If, however, unintentionally intercepted people have 
conceivable Fourth Amendment claims, these provisions make more sense 
and indicate the drafters of Section 1881a were concerned about the 
                                                          
 198.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
 199.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (Supp. 2012). 
 200.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (b) (emphasis added). 
 201.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a (d)(1)(B). 
 202.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1145–46 (2013). 
 203.  Id. at 1148. 
 204.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5), (g)(2)(A)(iv), (i)(3)(A), (i)(3)(B) (requiring that the 
authorized action be consistent with the Fourth Amendment). 
 205.  See supra Part II.B.1. 
 206.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
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potential for intercepting the communications of non-targeted 
individuals.
207
 
Despite evidence that the drafters of Section 1881a were concerned 
with people like the plaintiffs in Amnesty International, the Court 
determined that because the plaintiffs could not be surveillance targets 
under the statute, the statute did not regulate them.
208
  This perfunctory 
determination forced the Court to perform the causation and foreseeability 
analysis because the Court assumes the injuries of non-targeted plaintiffs 
are predicated on the actions of independent third parties, which decreases 
the probability the injury will occur.
209
  Yet, the drafters of Section 1881a 
recognized the language permitted the interception of U.S. persons and 
therefore added the Fourth Amendment requirements.
210
  The evidence that 
Congress thought the plaintiffs were potential “objects” of the statute’s 
authorized actions should have been sufficient for the Court to consider 
whether the plaintiffs were asserting injury to a cognizable right.
211
 
C.  The Court in Amnesty International Should Have Considered 
Narrowly Interpreting the Incidental Interception Exception in 
Response to Broad Surveillance Programs 
The plaintiffs in Amnesty International, even if the Court had found 
they were regulated under Section 1881a, would still have needed to 
overcome the incidental interception exception, which exempts from Fourth 
Amendment protection intercepted communications of individuals who are 
not surveillance targets.
212
  Supported by Title III wiretapping precedent,
213
 
the exemption has its foundation in physical search and seizure law, which 
does not allow non-targeted individuals to challenge searches on Fourth 
                                                          
 207.  See Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (“It is the duty of the court to give 
effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute . . . .”). 
 208.  Amnesty Int’l, 133 S. Ct. at 1148. 
 209.  See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Essentially, the standing question in 
such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly 
can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”). 
 210.  50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5), (g)(2)(A)(iv), (i)(3)(A), (i)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012).  
 211.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (“When the suit is one 
challenging the legality of government action . . . , the nature and extent of facts that must be 
averred . . . depends considerably upon whether the plaintiff is himself an object of the action . . . .  
If he is, there is ordinarily little question that the action . . . has caused him injury, and that a 
judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”). 
 212.  See, e.g., United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (“If there is 
probable cause as to one of the parties to a conversation . . . incriminating statements made by 
another party to the conversation can be intercepted and used even though probable cause is not 
established as to him.”). 
 213.  See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 (1974) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require law enforcement to identify on requests for wiretapping orders all 
those who may be intercepted). 
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Amendment grounds.
214
  The new characteristics of Section 1881a 
surveillance, however, make these precedents inapplicable because what 
was once “incidental” now has the potential to swallow a significant portion 
of intercepted communications and turn a class of U.S. persons into 
inadvertent targets. 
1.  Broad-scope Surveillance Will Intercept More Than 
“Incidental” Communications of U.S. Persons 
“Incidental” is typically thought to mean something that happens 
unexpectedly when another action occurs, something that happens as a 
secondary occurrence of another action, or something that is likely to 
happen if another action occurs.
215
  The overall impression is one of 
subordination to another activity or event.
216
  In programs of broad, 
indiscriminant surveillance, by contrast, the likelihood of acquiring 
incidental communications increases to the point that the amount of 
incidental communications may engulf the amount of targeted 
communications.
217
  By definition, communication requires more than one 
person.
218
  Although in some situations both parties will be targets, the 
sheer number of conversations being intercepted makes it almost certain 
that the majority of interceptions will be of non-targets.
219
  In cases like 
Amnesty International, if the government is intercepting nearly all of the 
communications of the plaintiffs’ clients, the government will likely 
                                                          
 214.  See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (“A person who is aggrieved by an 
illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of damaging evidence secured by a search 
of a third person’s premises or property has not had any of his Fourth Amendment rights 
infringed.”); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969) (“Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.”). 
 215.  THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 966 (2d ed. 1987).   
 216.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1990) (“[d]epending upon . . . something 
else as primary”). 
 217.  It is hard to believe that, if the government is requesting all communications from a 
country, as the lower court in Amnesty International suggested was entirely within the scope of 
Section 1881a authority, the majority of those communications would be of national security 
interest.  See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 126 (2d Cir. 2011) (describing the 
scope of potential authorizations); cf. Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing 
Beyond Control, WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-
america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/ (reporting that the NSA collects “1.7 
billion e-mails, phone calls and other types of communications” a day). 
 218.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (6th ed. 1990) (“sharing of knowledge by one with 
another”). 
 219.  See Siobhan Gorman & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, New Details Show Broader NSA 
Surveillance Reach, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Aug. 20, 2013, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324108204579022874091732470 
(reporting that although the NSA attempts to filter conversations originating between U.S. 
persons, “officials say the system’s broad reach makes it more likely that purely domestic 
communications will be incidentally intercepted and collected in the hunt for foreign ones”). 
  
1044 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:1018 
intercept the plaintiffs’ communications with the clients.220  In fact, such 
communications may be highly desirable to the government because of 
their content, more so than mundane social communications.
221
  It is 
difficult to imagine, therefore, that any interception of the plaintiffs’ 
communications with the surveillance targets will be totally inadvertent
222
 
even if their acquisition was not the government’s stated intent. 
2.  Section 1881a Surveillance Is Distinct from the Surveillance the 
Court Previously Considered 
As further argument against an exception, the situation in Amnesty 
International is distinguishable from cases in which incidental interceptions 
were held to be exempt from Fourth Amendment protection.  In United 
States v. Kahn, the Title III wiretap order was limited in duration and 
scope.
223
  It was also monitored frequently by the court.
224
  By contrast, 
Section 1881a authorizations are longer in duration, broader in scope, and 
less monitored by the FISC.
225
  Because the likelihood and potential 
severity of government intrusion are much greater under Section 1881a, 
there is more reason to protect those who are not targets of the search.
226
  
For similar reasons of scope, the non-target exception for physical searches 
offers inappropriate guidance.  Physical searches are subject to bright-line, 
                                                          
 220.  NSA minimization procedures specifically refer to attorney-client communications, so 
the government apparently understands that such interceptions will occur.  OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF 
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2011 MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS 
AMENDED, § 4 (2011), available at 
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Minimization%20Procedures%20used%20by%20NSA%20in
%20Connection%20with%20FISA%20SECT%20702.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
 221.  See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1157–58 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the government would want to intercept the types of conversations 
plaintiffs have with foreign nationals and would need Section 1881a’s expanded scope to do so). 
 222.  Cf. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that 
the government’s interception of the communications of an American who was suspected of 
working with al Qaeda was not “incidental” because the government should have anticipated that 
it would have intercepted his communications). 
 223.  United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 154 (1974). 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  See generally 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(1)–(3) (Supp. 2012) (detailing the FISC’s 
responsibilities in reviewing certifications and minimization procedures); see also Amnesty Int’l 
USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the FISC reviews only “the 
government’s general procedures,” not individual surveillance activities). 
 226.  But see Skinner v. Railway Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 640–41 (1989) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting) (claiming that the balancing test used to excuse special exemptions to Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirements inexcusably weakens the protections afforded by the 
Constitution). 
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geographical limitations,
227
 unlike global communication surveillance, 
which can involve many individuals in many countries.
228
  The potential for 
substantial government intrusion militates against an exception.
229
 
Additionally, all U.S. persons do not bear this risk of intrusion 
generally and equally.  The only U.S. persons who risk incidental 
interception are those who interact with non-U.S. citizens living abroad.
230
  
Thus, a risk of significant intrusion is borne by a limited, yet large,
231
 class 
of people.  This is not unheard of in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as 
many classes of people have been held to be exempt from various Fourth 
Amendment search protections.
232
  The existence of a phenomenon, 
however, does not mean it is equally defensible in all cases.  For example, 
the Court held in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
233
 that school administrators are not 
required to show probable cause before conducting searches of students.
234
  
The Court reached this conclusion by balancing the intrusion upon the 
students’ privacy with the school’s need to create a safe learning 
environment.
235
  Crucially, the Court decided that warrantless school 
searches must be “reasonable[],” not that students had no expectation of 
                                                          
 227.  See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 1043 (2013) (holding that law 
enforcement can only search a person incident to the execution of a search warrant when they are 
in the immediate vicinity of the premises being searched). 
 228.  Cf. United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (describing the 
scope of surveillance as incorporating five phone lines and a “safehouse” where numerous 
individuals stayed “when passing through Nairobi”).   
 229.  See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he 
concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the Fourth Amendment vanish completely 
when we slavishly allow an all-powerful government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and 
other benign purposes, to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them from 
the pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength to carry on.”); 
see also id. (“Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known.”). 
 230.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (permitting the targeting of individuals “located outside the 
United States”). 
 231.  The exact number of U.S. persons who could be subject to surveillance is difficult to 
determine, but it is indisputable that the government has “overcollect[ed]” information.  Eric 
Lichtblau & James Risen, Officials Say U.S. Wiretaps Exceeded Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2009, 
at A1.  The ACLU requested information about the extent of FISA surveillance, but the FBI 
replied that it would not comply because if people were aware the telecommunication companies 
were cooperating, they might sue the companies.  Alex Abdo, FBI: If We Told You, You Might 
Sue, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (May 10, 2011, 1:02 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security/fbi-if-we-told-you-you-might-sue-0.   
 232.  See, e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (holding that 
public schools could conduct suspicionless drug testing of student athletes); Skinner v. Railway 
Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (holding that the Federal Railway Administration 
regulations allowing for the suspicionless drug testing of railroad workers did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment).  
 233.  469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 234.  Id. at 342. 
 235.  Id. at 340. 
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privacy at all.
236
  The distinction is important because it indicates that even 
when faced with dire social problems, such as student drug use or 
violence,
237
 the Court has still adhered to the Fourth Amendment 
cornerstone of “reasonableness” by engaging in a balancing of interests.238  
This balancing requirement is incompatible with the blanket acceptance that 
the Fourth Amendment does not protect incidentally intercepted people, no 
matter the level of intrusion.
239
 
The goal of this Note is not to discount the threat of terrorism and the 
government’s need to investigate potential dangers,240 but merely to argue 
that the Court should have reassessed the proper balance in light of the 
government’s increased authority, rather than using standing to defer to 
Congress and the Executive.
241
  This is also not to suggest that the 
government abuses its power by intentionally acquiring information from 
U.S. persons.  The system of rules created to prevent interception of 
domestic information is complex,
242
 even if it occasionally fails to protect 
as intended or if some consider the level of protection unsatisfactory.
243
  
Had the Court reached the merits of the claims in Amnesty International, it 
could have spoken to the sufficiency of the minimization measures as well 
                                                          
 236.  Id. at 343. 
 237.  See id. at 339 (“[I]n recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: 
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems.”). 
 238.  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (concluding that “the proper balance” 
between individual privacy and police safety requires that an officer have “narrowly drawn 
authority” to conduct a search for weapons, “where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with 
an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the 
individual for a crime”). 
 239.  This acceptance was apparent in the opinions dissenting from the denial of rehearing en 
banc.  See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi, J., 
dissenting) (“Coincidental interceptees, however, cannot claim a personal Fourth Amendment 
right to be identified or to have probable cause established as to themselves as a precondition to 
reasonable surveillance.”).  
 240.  Cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
upholding civil liberty to the detriment of safety “will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into 
a suicide pact”).  
 241.  The Court in Amnesty International explicitly stated that the “‘standing inquiry has been 
especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute would force us to decide whether an 
action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.’”  
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819–20 (1997)).  
 242.  See Stewart Baker, Why the NSA Needs Your Phone Calls . . . and Why You (Probably) 
Shouldn’t Worry About It, FOREIGN POLICY (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/why_the_nsa_needs_your_phone_calls 
(labeling the minimization procedures “elaborate”). 
 243.  See, e.g., Barton Gellman, NSA Broke Privacy Rules Thousands of Times per Year, Audit 
Finds, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-
broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-
a07f-49ddc7417125_story.html (describing the results of an internal NSA audit as finding mostly 
unintended violations, but “[t]he most serious incidents included a violation of a court order and 
unauthorized use of data [of] about more than 3,000 Americans and green-card holders”). 
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as the legal framework that created them.  Instead, the opinion artfully 
dodged the question by focusing on the probability of injury. 
Hence, Amnesty International was a lost opportunity.  The drafters of 
Section 1881a took care to include protections for U.S. persons by 
explicitly prohibiting the government from intentionally targeting them for 
surveillance and by requiring that Section 1881a surveillance conform to 
the Fourth Amendment.
244
  The incidental interception exception skirts both 
these protections.  Because the nature of this surveillance is so different 
from the exception’s existing applications, the Supreme Court should have 
analyzed whether all interceptions of non-targeted individuals are actually 
“incidental.”  Even if the Court had found that the incidental interception 
exception applied and that the plaintiffs still lacked standing because they 
had not asserted a cognizable right, the opinion would have alerted 
Congress as to whether additional statutory protections were needed.  It 
would also have provided guidance for the lower courts.  Instead, the 
decision rests on a chain of causation argument that seems incredulous to 
even a casual observer of current events,
245
 which, contrary to the 
majority’s assertions,246 have shown the government is very likely to 
conduct broad-scope surveillance successfully.
247
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court refused 
to grant standing to U.S. persons who feared the U.S. government would 
intercept their communications with non-U.S. persons living in foreign 
countries.
248
  The Court found that since the plaintiffs could not be actual 
targets of surveillance authorized under the challenged statute, 50 U.S.C. 
Section 1881a, they could not show their interception was sufficiently 
certain to occur.
249
  For similar reasons, the plaintiffs’ expenditures in 
response to their fear of surveillance could not constitute sufficient injury to 
confer standing.
250
  By refusing to grant standing, the Court severely limited 
                                                          
 244.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b) (Supp. 2012) (forbidding the targeting of U.S. persons located 
within the United States and requiring that surveillance comply with Fourth Amendment 
requirements). 
 245.  See, e.g., Timeline of Edward Snowden’s Revelations, AL-JAZEERA AM., 
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by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden). 
 246.  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). 
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have made it more likely the government will collect surveillance). 
 248.  Id. at 1146 (majority opinion). 
 249.  Id. at 1150. 
 250.  Id. at 1152–53. 
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the ability of U.S. persons to challenge the increasingly broad surveillance 
programs conducted by the federal government.
251
  Additionally, the 
Court’s inquiry into the imminence of the injury will do little to remedy the 
confusion and uncertainty regarding when an injury is sufficiently likely to 
occur such that a plaintiff can bring suit in federal court.
252
  The Court’s 
analysis will likewise do little to clarify whether incidentally intercepted 
U.S. persons can challenge surveillance laws.
253
  The Court could have 
given more guidance to lower courts and Congress had it recognized the 
plaintiffs were a class of individuals the drafters of Section 1881a 
contemplated as being potentially intercepted individuals
254
 and, as such, 
their claim for standing should have been analyzed under a more lenient 
standard.
255
  Although the Court still could have denied standing by 
refusing to narrow the incidental interception exception, the need for robust 
Fourth Amendment protection from ever-increasing governmental 
invasions of privacy suggests that the Court should reverse its course of 
selecting certain activities and people for less Fourth Amendment 
protection.
256
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